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THE FREEDOM OF PROSELYTISM UNDER
THE FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Moshe Hirsch*
Religions interact with one another in various ways, however, prosely-
tism unquestionably is one of the most sensitive topics in inter-religious
affairs. With respect to the relationship between Jews and Christians,
Eugene Fisher described proselytism as "[o]ne of the most ancient and
disastrous.., tensions between the Jewish and Christian communities."'
Conflicting views regarding proselytism also gave rise to considerable
tensions between other religions.2 In light of these opposing perspec-
tives, it is not surprising that the shaping of international norms in this
sphere has become a contentious issue in the international arena.
I. CONVERSION AND PROSELYTISM: INTER-RELIGIOUS AND INTER-
PERSONAL DIMENSIONS
The processes of proselytism and conversion may be examined on two
levels: (1) the inter-religious level, in other words, the interaction be-
tween two religious groups, and (2) the inter-personal level, that is, the
interaction between the proselytizer and the potential proselyte. These
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law and Department of International Relations, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem. I am grateful to Professor Natan Lerner, Professor Ruth Lapi-
doth, Professor Eyal Benvenisti, and Dr. Leonard Hammer for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts. Additionally, I would like to thank Mrs. Daniela Rothman for her valuable
research assistance.
1. Eugene J. Fisher, A New Maturity in Christian-Jewish Dialogue: An Annotated
Bibliography 1975-89, in IN OUR TIME 107, 136 (Eugene J. Fisher & Leon Klenicki eds.,
1990). See, for example, the Israeli legislation prohibiting the provision or promise of ma-
terial benefits as an inducement to change a religion, Penal Law Amendment (Enticement
to Change Religion) Law, 1977, 32 L.S.I. 62, (1977-78).
2. See Harold J. Berman, Religious Rights in Russia at a Time of Tumultuous Tran-
sition: A Historical Theory, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE:
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 285, 301-03 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996)
[hereinafter RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS] (discussing the tensions stemming from the ef-
forts of the Russian Orthodox Church to repel Western evangelical missionaries); W. Cole
Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework, in RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 1, 4-5 (examining the emergence of proselytism as a source of
tension and divisiveness among various religious denominations and its impact on interna-
tional politics).
Catholic University Law Review
inexorably linked dimensions present difficult questions concerning in-
ternational human rights.
Conversion constitutes a dynamic dimension of every religion.
Through this process, religions acquire new believers and lose existing
ones. Generally, "(e)very religion strives to increase the number of its
adherents, while concomitantly avoiding, as much as possible, conver-
sions of its believers to other religions. The motivation underlying these
concurrent aims derives from several sources, the most prominent of
which is the metaphysical moral conception of contemporary world re-
ligions.3 This moral vision engenders the "desire to bring about the uni-
versal acceptance and application of the vision, which it holds to be uni-
versally true in principle."4
The substance of international legal rules pertaining to proselytism are
controversial between states and religions because they are designed to
regulate activity in a competitive environment. The basic setting in
which the process of conversion takes place closely resembles a zero-sum
game. In a zero-sum game, whatever one player wins, the other player
loses.5 Likewise in inter-religious conversions, every new convert to a
religion is an apostate to another religion. The religions' preferences are
opposed and they are considered rivals.6
Different religions develop distinct attitudes with respect to conversion
and proselytism that evolve over time. The difference between the basic
approaches of the major contemporary religions towards proselytism,
particularly between Judaism and Christianity, is remarkable. Histori-
cally, proselytism has been central to Christianity,' however, the Jewish
3. See Robert W. Hefner, World Building and the Rationality of Conversion, in
CONVERSION TO CHRISTIANITY: HISTORICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON A GREAT TRANSFORMATION 3, 6-10 (Robert W. Hefner ed., 1993) (reviewing com-
peting theories explaining the impetus behind proselytism among the various world relig-
ions).
4. Max L. Stackhouse, Missionary Activity, in 9 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION
563, 563 (Mircea Eliade ed., 1987).
5. See DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 4 (1991) (discussing
the concept of zero-sum game); JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL
SCIENTISTS 74-75 (1994) (same).
6. For other settings in the international arena presenting strong features of zero-
sum games, see Moshe Hirsch, The Future Negotiations Over Jerusalem, Strategical Factors
and Game Theory, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 699, 700 (1996) (analyzing the status of Jerusalem
according to the principles of game theory).
7. See William R. Hutchison, Christianity, Culture, and Complications: Protestant
Attitudes toward Missions, in PUSHING THE FAITH: PROSELYTISM AND CIVILITY IN A
PLURALISTIC WORLD 78, 79-80 (Martin E. Marty & Frederick E. Greenspahn eds., 1988)
[hereinafter PUSHING THE FAITH] (discussing the roots of the Protestant mission); Ste-
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faith generally has refrained from proselytic efforts.8 Notably, although
the Catholic Church discontinued missionary campaigns that target
Jews,9 other Christian denominations still engage in such proselytism.
The disparate missionary approaches of different religions have influ-
enced greatly their positions concerning the legal question of whether
proselytism should be allowed or prohibited.
Under international law, proselytism is viewed as inter-personal in na-
ture and governed by human rights law. The freedom to proselytize im-
plicates two distinct, but related, notions of freedom: the freedom of the
proselytizers to conduct proselytizing activities and the freedom of the
potential proselyte not to be interfered with by such activities. This dis-
tinction is made in pursuance to Sir Isaiah Berlin's seminal essay Two
Concepts of Liberty.1° Berlin distinguished between the "negative" and
the "positive" senses of freedom. According to Berlin, the negative
sense refers to the freedom to be free of unwanted interference.11 Berlin
argues that "[t]he wider the area of non-interference the wider my free-
dom., 12 In contrast, the positive sense refers to individual autonomy to
exercise religious freedom without external constraints or coercion."
Thus, the positive sense embodies the view that "I am free if, and only if,
I plan my life in accordance with my own will."' 4
When we turn to international human rights law, and particularly to
the freedom of religion, the distinction between Berlin's notions of free-
dom corresponds to the freedom to maintain a religion without interfer-
ence and the freedom to persuade another person to abandon his relig-
ion in favor of another. Undoubtedly, these two aspects of proselytic
phen Neill, Preface to STEPHEN NEILL, CHRISTIAN MISSIONS 9 (1965) (commenting on
the overwhelming breadth of history surrounding the expansion of Christianity); Robert J.
Schreiter, Changes in Roman Catholic Attitudes Toward Proselytism and Mission, in
PUSHING THE FAITH, supra, at 93 (discussing Christian mission).
8. However, Jews actively proselytized in the late ancient and early medieval times.
See Robert Goldenberg, The Place of Other Religions in Ancient Jewish Thought, with
Particular Reference to Early Rabbinic Judaism, in PUSHING THE FAITH, supra note 7, at
27, 27-40 (tracing the development of proselytic attitudes in the Jewish faith); Robert M.
Seltzer, Joining the Jewish People from Biblical to Modern Times, in PUSHING THE FAITH,
supra note 7, at 41, 41-63 (same).
9. See Interview with Adv. Eitan Margalit, Advisor to the Israeli Minister of Foreign
Affairs on Inter-Religious Affairs, in 2 JUSTICE 24, 28 (June 1994).
10. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (Cox & Wyman, Ltd. 1979)
(1969).
11. See id. at 122 (discussing the notion of "negative" freedom).
12. Id. at 123.
13. See id. at 131-34 (discussing the notion of "positive" freedom).
14. Id. at 143-44.
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freedom frequently clash. The legal system is assigned the task of recon-
ciling these competing interests. Naturally, the legal equilibrium is dy-
namic and influenced by various religious and geo-political factors.
II. THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE FUNDAMENTAL
AGREEMENT: ASYMMETRIC OBLIGATIONS
The provisions of the 1993 Fundamental Agreement between the Holy
See and the State of Israel 5 (1993 Fundamental Agreement) obligate
both parties to respect the human right to freedom of religion. However,
the 1993 Fundamental Agreement does not precisely define this impor-
tant obligation. Instead, the Agreement incorporates specific rules per-
taining to the freedom of religion that were set out in other international
instruments. Surprisingly, the parties' obligations regarding the freedom
of religion are defined in separate provisions and are not necessarily
symmetrical.
Israel's obligations in this regard are enumerated in Article 1(1) of the
1993 Fundamental Agreement, which provides that "[t]he State of Is-
rael... affirms its continuing commitment to uphold and observe the
human right to freedom of religion and conscience, as set forth in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in other international in-
struments to which it is a party."'6 Likewise, the Holy See's obligations
appear in Article 1(2) stating that "[tihe Holy See... affirms the Catho-
lic Church's commitment to uphold the human right to freedom of relig-
ion and conscience, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and in other international instruments to which it is a party."'
7
These provisions clearly bind both parties to protect the freedom of
religion as provided under the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948 Universal Declaration). 8 Yet the application of additional
international rules depends upon whether a particular party, and not
both, is a party to a certain international instrument. Thus, apart from
the mutual obligations established by the 1948 Universal Declaration,
each, party to the 1993 Fundamental Agreement is bound to protect the
freedom of religion only to the extent that it is a party to another interna-
15. See The Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and the State of Israel,
Dec. 30, 1993, Vatican-Isr., art. 1, 33 I.L.M. 153, 154 (1994) [hereinafter Fundamental
Agreement].
16. Id. art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added).
17. Id. art. 1, § 2 (emphasis added).
18. Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948) [hereinafter 1948 Universal Declaration].
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tional instrument. Therefore, beyond the mutual obligations under the
1948 Universal Declaration, the parties' duties regarding the freedom of
religion are not necessarily symmetrical.
The primary international instruments which define the freedom of re-
ligion are the 1948 Universal Declaration,'9 the 1966 International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),0 and the 1981 Declaration
on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief (1981 Declaration).2 Israel has joined the
ICCPR and is a member of the United Nations where the 1981 Declara-
tion was adopted by consensus. The Holy See, on the other hand, has
neither joined the ICCPR nor is it a member of the United Nations. As a
result, although Israel is bound under the 1993 Fundamental Agreement
to observe the freedom of religion vis-A-vis the Holy See, in accordance
with the above international instruments, the Holy See is bound to ob-
serve this freedom vis-A-vis Israel, in accordance with the 1948 Universal
Declaration alone.
The following sections examine the evolution of the freedom to
proselytize as part of the freedom of religion. Undoubtedly, the subject
of proselytism aroused much controversy during the deliberations of the
major global documents that defined freedom of religion under interna-
tional law.2 Finally, this article draws its conclusions regarding the scope
of the freedom of proselytism in Holy See-Israel relations.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE FREEDOMS TO MAINTAIN AND CHANGE A
RELIGION
The first arena of the inter-religious controversy regarding conversion
and proselytism was the UN General Assembly's Third Committee. The
draft Article 18 of the 1948 Universal Declaration, as submitted to the
General Assembly, provided that: "[e]veryone has the right to freedom
19. See id.
20. Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR].
21. G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51
(1982) [hereinafter 1981 Declaration].
22. On the evolution of the freedom of religion in international law, see BAHIYYIH
G. TAHZIB, FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: ENSURING EFFECTIVE INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION 63-121 (1996) (surveying the provisions from the major
global documents from 1945 to the present); John P. Humphrey, Political and Related
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 171,
176-77 (Theodor Meron ed., 1988) (reviewing the historical development in the global
recognition of religious freedom in international legal intruments); Natan Lerner, Relig-
ious Human Rights Under the United Nations, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note
2, at 79 (discussing the evolution of the freedom of religion under international law).
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of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change
his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance. ' 3
The representative of Saudi Arabia objected to the language contained
in the second portion of draft Article 18 that recognized "the right to
change one's religion or belief."24 Although the objection concerned the
freedom of individuals to change religions, the explanation provided by
the Saudi Arabian representative, as well as those of other Muslim states,
indicated that the objection was aimed at avoiding foreign mission and
political intervention.2& The Third Committee rejected the Saudi Ara-
bian proposal to delete the second part of the draft article. Draft Article
18 was ultimately adopted by twenty-seven states with five Islamic states
against and twelve abstentions." The final version of the 1948 Universal
Declaration included the original formulation.27
The issue of conversion re-emerged during the drafting stages of the
ICCPR. The text submitted to the General Assembly provided, in part,
as follows:
1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion. This right shall include freedom to main-
tain or to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either indi-
vidually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice
and teaching.28
When the Third Committee of the General Assembly considered this
text, the representative of Saudi Arabia objected to the formulation be-
cause it could be construed to favor missionary activities.29 Following the
proposed amendments by Brazil, the Philippines, and the United King-
23. 1948 Universal Declaration, supra note 18, at 74. On the status of the Universal
Declaration in international law, see Moshe Hirsch, The Universal Declaration Rights: 40
Years Old, 29 INT'L PROBS. SOC. & POL. 49 (1990) (Hebrew with summary in English).
24. J. A. Walkate, The Right of Everyone to Change His Religion or Belief: Some Ob-
servations, 30 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REV. 146,152 (1983).
25. See TAHZIB, supra note 22, at 73-75 (citing statements of Saudi Arabia's repre-
sentative in addressing the U.N. General Assembly's Third Committee).
26. See id. at 75.
27. See Walkate, supra note 24, at 152.
28. Id. at 153 (quoting draft Article 18, § 1 of the ICCPR); see also id. at 153-54 (dis-
cussing the negotiations of the Commission on Human Rights about this provision).
29. See TAHZIB, supra note 22, at 84-85; see also Natan Lerner, Proselytism, Change
of Religion, and International Human Rights, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 101, 119-21 (1998)
(discussing the deliberations surrounding Article 18 of the ICCPR).
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dom, the Third Committee compromised between the conflicting pro-
posals. Under an amendment that was later incorporated into the final
version of the ICCPR, the phrase "to maintain or to change his religion
or belief" was replaced by the words "to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice."3 The final text of Article 18 reads as follows:
(1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom,
either individually or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching.3
The second paragraph of Article 18 was adopted, as amended, by the
General Assembly providing that "[n]o one shall be subject to coercion
which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief
of his choice., 32 Article 18(3) provides that "[f]reedom to manifest one's
religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health,
or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others."
33
The main difference between the text of Article 18 of the Universal
Declaration and that of the 1966 Covenant is that the explicit freedom
"to change his religion" in the Universal Declaration was replaced by
more vague words of "to have or to adopt a religion.., of his choice."
The third global instrument concerning the freedom of religion, the
1981 Declaration, is not a binding treaty like the ICCPR, but is consid-
ered as a guide for interpreting international norms that define the free-
dom of religion.34 In light of the former debates, it is not surprising that
30. See Walkate, supra note 24, at 153; see also Brice Dickson, The United Nations
and Freedom of Religion, 44 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 327, 342 (1995) (discussing the negotia-
tions preceding the adoption of Article 18 under the ICCPR).
31. ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 18, § 1, at 178.
32. Id. art. 18, § 2, at 178.
33. Id. art. 18, § 3, at 178. Subsection 4 of Article 18 provides that: "The States Par-
ties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when
applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in
conformity with their own convictions." Id. art. 18, § 4, at 178.
34. See TAZHIB, supra note 22, at 186-88 (reviewing the legal status of the 1981 Dec-
laration in the international arena); Dickson, supra note 30, at 344 (discussing the distin-
guishing features of the 1981 Declaration); Lerner, supra note 29, at 114 (characterizing
the 1981 Declaration as "the most important international instrument regarding religious
rights"); Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN
Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 82 AM. J.
INT'L L. 487, 488 (1988) (asserting that because the 1981 Declaration was drafted in nor-
mative terms, it "gives specific content to the general statements of rights to freedom of
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the right to change a religion was fiercely debated during the delibera-
tions over the 1981 Declaration.35 The trend towards the exclusion, or at
least the erosion, of any explicit reference to the right to change a relig-
ion has continued and even intensified.
The text of draft Article 1 of the 1981 Declaration, submitted to the
General Assembly by the Commission of Human Rights and the Eco-
nomic and Social Council, was identical to Article 18 of the ICCPR. The
language regarding the individual's freedom "to have or to adopt a re-
36ligion or belief of his choice" was opposed by forty Muslim states.
Again, the desire to avoid tacit approval of proselytism was one of the
primary reasons that motivated the Muslim states to propose the deletion
of these words.37 The Westerners realized that the allegiance of the
Muslim states held the key to the adoption of the 1981 Declaration. To
garner universal approval, the Western states acquiesced to the inclusion
of the latter proposal contingent upon the adoption of a new article in
order not to derogate from the Universal Declaration and the Interna-
tional Covenants.
38
The final version of Article 1 which emerged from these negotiations
provides that:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a
religion or whatever belief of his choice, and freedom, either
individually or in community with others and in public or pri-
vate, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching.
religion... contained in the major human rights instruments").
35. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 677-684 (1980) (discussing the history of the 1981 Declaration); TAHZIB, supra
note 22, at 164 (describing the road leading to the adoption of the 1981 Declaration as
"long, arduous and full of obstacles"); Roger S. Clark, The United Nations and Religious
Freedom, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 197, 197 (1978) (examining the difficulty experi-
enced by the United Nations in reaching an agreement to eliminate intolerance and dis-
crimination based on religion or belief); Natan Lerner, The Final Text of the UN Declara-
tion Against Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, 12 ISR. Y.B. ON
HUM. RTS. 185-88 (1982) (discussing the compromise regarding the "right to change a re-
ligion" that was adopted under the 1981 Declaration); Natan Lerner, Toward a Draft
Declaration Against Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 11 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS.
82-103 (1981) (providing a section-by-section analysis of the proposed draft that later be-
came the 1981 Declaration).
36. See Walkate, supra note 24, at 148-150 (discussing the Islamic objections to the
"right to change one's religion" provisions).
37. See Clark, supra note 35, at 197.
38. See TAHZIB, supra note 22, at 167-68; Walkate, supra note 24, at 150.
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2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair
his freedom to have a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be sub-
ject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.39
Article 8 embodies the compromise that paved the road for the adop-
tion of the 1981 Declaration, providing that: "[n]othing in the present
Declaration shall be construed as restricting or derogating from any right
defined in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Interna-
tional Covenants on Human Rights.,
40
IV. THE FREEDOM OF PROSELYTISM UNDER CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The examination of the aforementioned international documents
raises the question of whether the freedom of religion includes the free-
dom to proselytize. First, it is important to distinguish between the in-
ternal and the external aspects of the freedom of religion. The internal
aspect embraces both the internal (autonomous) freedom to believe in a
religion or to change it without interference. The external aspect refers
to the freedom to manifest one's religion either alone or in a commu-
nity. 1 When analyzing the evolution of the freedom of religion under
these global instruments, it becomes apparent that while the debate be-
tween Muslim and Western states focused on text regarding the internal
aspect of the freedom-whether individuals have the right to change re-
ligion-the apparent motive underlying the Muslim states' position con-
cerned the external aspect or the mission and proselytism freedom.
Under general international law, the individual's freedom to change a
religion, on the internal aspect, is hardly disputed. 42 Consequently, na-
39. 1981 Declaration, supra note 21, art. 1, at 171.
40. Id. art. 8, at 172.
41. The external freedom to manifest a religion is subject to certain limitations. See
id. art. 1, § 3, at 171 (providing that the freedom to manifest a religion may be limited only
when necessary "to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights.., of others"); ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 18, § 3, at 178 (same). The internal as-
pect of freedom of religion, however, is not similarly constrained.
42. See UN Human Rights Committee: General Comment No. 22 on Article 18 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 15 Hum. Rts. L.J. 233, 233 (1994)
[hereinafter Human Rights Committee]; TAHZIB, supra note 22, at 169; Karl Josef Partsch,
Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS 209, 211 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Sullivan, supra note 34, at 495;
Walkate, supra note 24, at 154-55.
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tional laws that proscribe apostasy are inconsistent with contemporary
international law.43 The question regarding the freedom of proselytism,
however, is still unsettled. This question, as elaborated above, involves
two distinct freedoms: the freedom of the proselytizer to conduct prose-
lytizing activities (the "positive" sense of freedom) and the freedom of
the potential convert/proselyte not to be interfered in his faith by prose-
lytizing activities (the "negative" sense of freedom). 44 The elements con-
stituting the freedom to proselytize, the negative and positive aspects, are
expressed in international human rights law as the freedom to maintain a
religion and the freedom to change someone else's religion respectively.
We shall first examine the freedom to conduct proselytizing activities.
Next, we will consider the relationship between the two freedoms under
contemporary international law.
Whether an individual has the (positive) freedom to proselytize is de-
rived from the external dimension of the freedom of religion. Although
the freedom of proselytism is not explicitly mentioned in international
agreements, the external aspect of the freedom is commonly described as
the "freedom, either individually or in community with others... to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and
teaching., 45  Article 6 of the 1981 Declaration elaborates further and
provides a list of nine specific freedoms included in the freedom of re-
ligion, some of which may be relevant to proselytism. Article 6(d) of the
1981 Declaration provides for the freedom "[t]o write, issue and dissemi-
nate relevant publications," and Article 6(e) refers to the freedom "[t]o
teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes. 46 Addi-
tionally, the freedom of expression may protect other proselytic activi-
ties.47
43. See ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND
POLITICS 141 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the Shari'a rule that forbids Muslims from con-
verting from Islam).
44. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text (discussing these concepts).
45. 1981 Declaration, supra note 21, art. 1., § 1, at 171; see also ICCPR, supra note 20,
art. 18, § 1, at 178; 1948 Universal Declaration, supra note 18, art. 18, at 74.
46. 1981 Declaration, supra note 21, art. 6, §§(d)-(e), at 172. Moreover, Article 6 also
states that this list of freedoms does not constitute an exhaustive list. See id. (providing
that "the right to freedom of ... religion... shall include, inter alia, the following free-
doms"); see also TAHZIB, supra note 22, at 183 (enumerating various freedoms that were
excluded from Article 6 of the 1981 Declaration); Human Rights Committee, supra note
42, at 233 (listing various acts that fall under the rubric of manifesting a religion or belief).
47. See ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 19, § 2, at 178 ("Everyone shall have the right to
freedom of expression .... ); 1948 Universal Declaration, supra note 18, art. 19, at 74-75
(same); infra note 57 (discussing the relationship between the freedom of religion and the
freedom of expression).
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In light of these international agreements, it is clear that where prose-
lytism is part of "manifesting a religion with others," proselytism is prima
facie included with the freedom of religion. This is clearly the case with
some religions like Christianity, for whose adherents the mission is an es-
sential duty.1 In opposition stands the freedom of adherents of other
faiths to practice their religion without interference. The ICCPR and the
1981 Declaration describe this autonomy as the "freedom to have a re-
ligion." The relationship between the freedom to maintain a religion and
the freedom to change a religion contained in international agreements
warrants careful scrutiny.
The evolution of the texts of the universal documents shows that the
emphasis has shifted from the freedom to change a religion toward an
emphasis on the individual freedom to retain a religion without interfer-
ence. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration explicitly refers to the
freedom to change a religion, but does not mention the freedom to main-
tain a religion. Article 18 of the ICCPR refers to the freedom "to have a
religion," but obscures the freedom to change a religion-"freedom to
adopt a religion.., of his choice. 4 9 Article 1 of the 1981 Declaration
mentions the "freedom to have a religion" but the reference to freedom
to change a religion was deliberately deleted from the final text.0
This shift does not indicate that the freedom to change one's religion
on the internal level is not protected under international law, or that
proselytism is not included within the freedom of religion on the external
level." However, the tendency to emphasize the freedom to maintain a
religion and to weaken, or obscure, the freedom to change a religion
should not be underestimated. Rather, this trend should be given due
weight when delineating the border between the freedom of proselytism
and the individual's freedom to maintain a religion without interference.
The boundary between the freedom of proselytism and the freedom to
maintain a religion without interference may be drawn in various loca-
tions alongside a continuum. At one end of the continuum, the freedom
to maintain a religion is completely protected by the prohibition against
proselytism, at the other, an absolute protection is accorded to the free-
48. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the Christian mission); infra
notes 59-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Kokkinakis case).
49. ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 18, § 1, at 178.
50. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting that although the reference to
freedom to change a religion was deleted from the 1981 Declaration, Article 18 preserves
this freedom under the Universal Declaration and international covenants).
51. See text accompanying note 45.
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dom of proselytism by a norm that prohibits any restriction on such ac-
tivities.
Two intermediate positions may reconcile the disparity between these
extremes. Nearer to the position assigning maximum protection to the
freedom of proselytism, it is possible to set a rule permitting proselytismS 52
with an exception prohibiting coercive acts, which impairs free choice.
Closer to the position assigning maximum protection to the freedom to
maintain a religion, it is possible to consider a religious belief as a "re-
stricted access domain." This "semi-private" religious53 realm should be
protected from certain intrusive acts, including some proselytism activi-
ties.
Maximum protection Restricted access Only coercive acts Maximum protection
to the freedom to religious domain prohibited. to the freedom to
maintain a religion (proselytism activi- change a religion
(complete prohibi- ties penetrating the (absolute freedom of
tion of proselytism). "semi-private" proselytism).
realm are prohib-
ited).
The difference between the two intermediate positions on the contin-
uum is the degree of limitation imposed on proselytic activities. Whereas
only coercive acts are prohibited under the second formulation, addi-
tional proselytic activities which invade the "semi-private" domain are
prohibited under the first formulation. Thus, both intermediate models
prohibit forced conversion or exerting improper pressure, for example,
52. The prohibition on coercion is explicitly mentioned in Article 18, subsection 2 of
the ICCPR, and Article 1, subsection 2, of the 1981 Declaration. See ICCPR, supra note
20, art. 18, § 2, at 178; 1981 Declaration, supra note 21, art. 1, § 2, at 171. These provisions
should certainly not dictate that all proselytic activities which do not involve coercion are
permitted. Such a conclusion could have been justified if Article 18(1) of the Covenant
and Article 1(1) of the Declaration would have protected only the freedom to proselytize
and not the freedom to maintain a religion. Thus, the two competing freedoms are in-
cluded in the first paragraph of these articles (though the freedom of proselytism only im-
plicitly, as part of the freedom to manifest a religion), and the borderline between them
should be drawn "within" the first paragraph, and not by a distinction between the main
clause stating the freedom and the second clause dealing with coercion.
53. See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428-30
(1980) (defining "privacy" as "a limitation of others' access to an individual"); see also
Lerner, supra note 29 (asserting that a "zone of privacy" is tantamount to a "zone of free-
dom" comprised of various qualities and lifestyles every individual seeks to experience).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 55-58 for the question of which proselytism
activities trespass the "semi-private" religious realm.
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by material inducements." However, actively approaching other persons
in order to persuade them to indicate or discuss their religious beliefs
would be permissible under the second intermediate position, but could
be prohibited under the first intermediate position protecting the "semi-
private" domain. 6
Having defined the alternative locations on the continuum, the unset-
tled question is which position reflects prevailing principles under inter-
national law. First, in light of the aforementioned global instruments, it
is clear that the two extreme positions on the scale are illegal under in-
ternational law. The freedom to proselytize, as a component of the free-
dom to manifest a religion, is protected under international law, and con-
sequently, a sweeping prohibition on proselytism is unlawful. On the
other hand, the freedom to maintain a religion is also protected under
international law, and an absolute freedom of proselytism, without limi-
tation will unquestionably be also illegal.
The two intermediate positions which restrict proselytism to a different
degree are central to the dilemma regarding the freedom to proselytize
under international law. The intermediate position which prohibits only
coercive acts is more consistent with the freedom to change a religion.
On the other hand, the "semi-private" position is more in line with the
freedom to maintain a religion. The above analysis of the evolution of
international law regarding the relationship between the freedoms to
maintain and to change a religion demonstrates that the current trend in
international law emphasizes the freedom to maintain a religion, thus ob-
scuring the freedom to change a religion. This trend suggests that the in-
termediate position representing the restricted access realm is more con-
sistent with contemporary international law.
Accordingly, this analysis of the evolution of the freedom of religion
leads to the conclusion that present international law permits proselytism
to the extent that it does not traverse the "limited access religious realm"
of individuals. One may suggest that Article 8 of the 1981 Declaration
preserves completely the previous equilibrium between the clashing
freedoms as it existed under the 1966 ICCPR and the 1948 Universal
Declaration. This view, however, overlooks the explicit and deliberate
55. On the activities which are considered "coercive acts," see Acrot Krishmaswain,
Study of Discrimination in the Matters of Religious Rights and Practice, 11 N.Y.U. J. OF
INT'L L. & POL. 227, 230-33 (1978); see also TAHZIB, supra note 22, at 127-28; Sullivan,
supra note 34, at 494.
56. See supra note 54 and accompanying text for further elaboration on proselytism
activities which are prohibited under the "semi-private" religious concept.
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change in the main provision in the 1981 Declaration (Article 1) which
was made following adamant opposition of forty Muslim states to the
57former treaty provisions.
The theme underlying the "semi-private" religious domain is that per-
sons should not be asked to reveal or discuss their religious preference-
either explicitly or implicitly through a request to participate in a relig-
ious activity-unless they have previously expressed a desire to do so.
Thus, for example, operating a religious center that provides religious ar-
ticles or services to persons who indicate their will to receive them is
permitted under this principle.58 Approaching a person without a prior
invitation in order to persuade him to discuss his religion, whether pri-
vately or publicly, constitutes a trespass upon the "semi-private" relig-
ious realm and should be prohibited.
V. THE KOKKINAKIS CASE AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
Before concluding our work, it would useful to examine the judgment
rendered by the European Court of Human Rights in Kokkinakis v.
Greece9 in light of the principles of general international law regarding
the freedom of proselytism. Mr. and Mrs. Kokkinakis visited the home
of Mrs. Kyriaki, a member of the Greek Orthodox Church, to discuss
with her possible conversion to the Jehovah's Witnesses. Mr. Kokkinakis
was subsequently found guilty and prosecuted under Greek law that pro-
scribed proselytism.6° His initial sentence was four months imprison-
57. Proselytism frequently involves freedom of expression, which is also protected
under international human rights law. The above provisions regarding the freedom of re-
ligion seem to constitute lex-specialist norms which regulate the subject of proselytism.
The motives underlying the freedom of expression do not necessarily apply to proselytism.
Proselytism may be perceived as an instrument to preserve the basic freedom to change a
religion. This, however, should not detract from the need to protect the corresponding
freedom to maintain a religion without interference of proselytism. The concept of "semi-
private religious realm," it is submitted, leads to an adequate balance between the com-
peting freedoms.
58. Similarly, the operation of religious television and radio channels, as well as
mailing various documents, is permissible under this principle.
59. 36 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 181 (Eur. Ct. on H.R. 1993); see also T. Jeremy
Gunn, Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human
Rights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 305, 318-30 (discussing the Kok-
kinakis case).
60. See Kokkinakis, 36 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 182 (discussing the provisions of
the Greek statutes that define and punish proselytism). Proselytism is expressly forbidden
under the Greek Constitution. See GREECE CONST. pt. II, art. 13, § 2 ("Proselytism is
prohibited."). Mrs. Kokkinkas was eventually acquitted. See id.
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ment, which was later converted into a pecuniary penalty.61 In his appli-
cation to the European Court of Human Rights, Mr. Kokkinakis argued,
inter alia, that the Greek criminal proceedings infringed his freedom of
religion under Article 9 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),62 which is
very similar to Article 18 of the 1948 Universal Declaration.
63
The European Commission and the Court of Human Rights ruled that
proselytism is included within the freedom to manifest one's religion, a
right protected by Article 9 of the ECHR.64 Consequently, the Greek
statute constituted an interference with Mr. Kokkinakis's exercise of his
right under the article.65 Next, the court considered whether the Greek
law was justified under the permitted restrictions on the freedom of re-
ligion provided under Article 9(2) of the ECHR.66 Greece contended
that the law aimed at prohibiting proselytism in order to protect the
freedom of religion of other people maintaining a different religion from
that of Mr. Kokkinakis.67 Both the Commission and the court agreed
that the law "has been in pursuit of a legitimate aim under Article 9 para.
2 [of the ECHR]: the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, re-
lied on by the Government." '
The next question examined by the court was whether the above leg-
islation was necessary in a democratic society. The court made a distinc-
tion between:
bearing Christian witness and improper proselytism. The for-
mer corresponds to true evangelism, which a report drawn up in
1956 under the auspices of the World Council of Churches de-
61. See Kokkinakis, 36 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 182.
62. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230 [hereinafter ECHR]. Article 9, section 1 of
the ECHR provides: "(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or be-
lief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance." Id.
63. See 1948 Universal Declaration, supra note 18, art. 18, at 74.
64. See Kokkinakis, 36 Y.B. Conv. on H.R. at 182-83.
65. See id. at 183.
66. See id. Article 9, section 2, of the ECHR provides that:
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
ECHR, supra note 62, art. 9, § 2.
67. See Kokkinakis, 36 Y.B. Conv. on H.R. at 183.
68. Id.
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scribes as an essential mission and responsibility of every Chris-
tian and every church. [T]he latter represent[s] a corruption or
deformation of it ... [and] is not compatible with respect for the
freedom of thought, conscience and religion of others."69
The court observed that the Greek courts established Mr. Kokkinakis's
liability by merely citing the Greek legislation without specifying in what
way he had attempted to convince his neighbor by improper means."'
Consequently, the court held that Mr. Kokkinakis' conviction was unjus-
71tified by a pressing social need. Moreover, the court concluded that the
conviction was disproportionate to the legitimate legislative aim and, as a
consequence, was not necessary in a democratic society.72 The court held
that the Greek law, as applied to Mr. Kokkinakis, violated Article 9 of
the ECHR.73
By evaluating the Kokkinakis decision in light of general principles of
international law, it is clear that the different legal rules prevailing in the
different systems lead to different conclusions regarding the freedom to
proselytize. First, it is important to examine similar legal principles rec-
ognized in both the European and global frameworks. The Commission
and the court in Kokkinakis recognized that the proselytism issue in-
volves both the freedom to manifest a religion through proselytism and
the freedom of the potential convert to maintain his religion. This was
the basis for the intermediate ruling accepting that the Greek prohibition
on proselytism "was in pursuit of a legitimate aim": protecting the free-
doms of others.74 This ruling is certainly consistent with the global prin-
ciples regarding proselytism.
Confronted with divergent aspects of the rival freedoms to proselytize
and to maintain a religion, the court distinguished between "bearing
Christian witness" and "improper proselytism,, 75 and held that the latter
is unlawful. Although the court did not define "improper proselytism," it
cited the report drawn under the auspices of The World Council of
Churches noting that proselytism may include violence, brainwashing,
offering material or social advantages, or exerting improper influence on








76. See Cases: Kokkinakis v. Greece, 17 E.H.R.R. 397,422 (1994).
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separating lawful and unlawful proselytism along the lines of the prohibi-
tion of "coercion" established in the ICCPR and 1981 Declaration.77
The texts of Article 9 of the ECHR and Article 18 of the Universal
Declaration are quite similar. It appears that the European Court of
Human Rights' attempt to balance the competing freedoms to maintain
and to change religion through the limitation of coercion is compatible
with the texts of these instruments. However, the court's equilibrium is
not necessarily consistent with the significant changes that occurred on
the global level following the conclusion of the ECHR. The develop-
ments in general international law, expressed in the different texts of the
ICCPR and the 1981 Declaration, shifted the focus from the freedom to
change a religion toward the freedom to maintain a religion without in-
terference.8 This process led to the current balance between these free-
doms: the "semi-private" religious realm.79
VI. THE PARTIES' OBLIGATIONS REGARDING PROSELYTISM UNDER
THE FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT
The obligations undertaken by the parties to the 1993 Fundamental
Agreement regarding the freedom of religion are asymmetrical: in addi-
tion to the Universal Declaration, each party is bound to observe this
freedom in accordance with international instruments to which it is a
party. An analysis of the international instruments shows that different
principles that balance the freedom to maintain a religion without inter-
ference and the freedom to proselytize emerged from different instru-
ments.
The Holy See is bound to observe the freedom of religion in accor-
dance with the 1948 Universal Declaration.8° The Universal Declaration
77. The 1981 Declaration and the ICCPR both prohibit coercive proselytic tactics
that impair the freedom of religion. See 1981 Declaration, supra note 21, art. 1, § 2, at 171;
ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 18, § 2, at 178.
78. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing the shift in focus toward
maintaining a religion without interference under international agreements).
79. Apart from the different legal principles that prevail in the different legal sys-
tems, the result also may have been influenced by the fact that the judges in the Kokki-
nakis case were European. The text of the judgment, including the crucial distinction
made by the court between "bearing Christian witness" and "improper proselytism"
(which was cited from a report drawn up under the auspices of the World Council of
Churches), suggests that these judges that comprised a majority of the court were influ-
enced by Christian beliefs. Christianity maintains starkly contrasting views regarding
proselytism in comparison to some other religions.
80. The Holy See is not a party to the ICCPR and is not a member of the United Na-
tions which adopted the 1981 Declaration.
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emphasizes the freedom to change a religion but does not explicitly men-
tion the freedom to maintain a religion. Thus, the principle that emerges
from the Universal Declaration is similar to that which was adopted by
the European Court of Human Rights in Kokkinakis: proselytism is
permitted as long as it does not involve coercive acts impairing free
choice.8
Israel is bound under the 1993 Fundamental Agreement to observe the
freedom of religion in accordance with the Universal Declaration, the
ICCPR, and the 1981 Declaration. The principle that emerges from
these instruments creates a different balance between the competing
freedoms: proselytic activities are allowed to the extent that they do not
invade the "semi-private" religious domain of others. Thus, the obliga-
tions regarding proselytism assigned to the Holy See and Israel under the
Fundamental Agreement are asymmetrical.
VII. CONCLUSION
The obligations accepted by Israel and the Holy See under the Fun-
damental Agreement regarding freedom of religion are not the same.
Apart from the Universal Declaration, both parties are bound to observe
the international instruments to which they are parties. Because of their
asymmetric legal postures, the parties are bound to comply with different
duties concerning proselytic freedom. Although the Holy See is bound
only to observe such freedom of proselytism with the narrow exception
regarding coercive tactics, Israel is obligated to respect proselytic free-
dom to the extent that such efforts do not involve activities which intrude
upon the "semi-private" religious sphere.
The evolution of international law reveals that the freedom to prosely-
tize is a source of tension not only between Jews and Christians, but also
among the other world religions. Developments in international human
rights law demonstrate that norms in this sphere are affected by the re-
ligious beliefs of different religions and geo-political influences of states
backing these religions. Notwithstanding the global controversy con-
cerning the breadth of proselytic freedom, certain rules have gained
broad acceptance under modern international law.
The rules governing proselytism that are widely accepted in the inter-
national community today are threefold. First, everyone has the freedom
to change his religion, and consequently, national laws that prohibit or
81. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, 36 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 181,183 (Eur. Ct. on H.R.
1993).
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punish "apostasy" are unlawful. Second, proselytism is included in the
freedom to manifest a religion for some religions and, therefore, pro-
tected to a certain extent under international law. Consequently, na-
tional laws prohibiting all proselytic activities are not consistent with in-
ternational human rights law. Finally, it is accepted that coercive
measures impairing free choice involved in proselytism are illegal.
The most controversial issue concerns the balance between the free-
dom to maintain a religion without interference and the freedom to
proselytize. The evolution of general international law on the freedom
of religion leads us to the conclusion that the border between these two
competing freedoms should be drawn along the "semi-private" religious
realm of each person. Certain proselytic activities that penetrate this
protective region should be prohibited under international law. The
freedom of believers to be free from unwanted interference should not
be overlooked. The specific rules derived from the concept of restricted-
access religious domain are not yet fully clear. Future developments may
further clarify this sensitive issue in international human rights law.

